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Abstract 
Turkey presents a fascinating case study on the potential fiscal consequences of price stability against a 
background characterised by a combination of recent central bank independence, a difficult path towards 
price stability, a high degree of dollarisation and a central bank balance sheet burdened with items that 
have little to do with monetary policy. A number of national central banks (NCBs) in Europe faced 
similar problems prior to joining EMU (and some of the new EU member countries’ NCBs also face 
similar problems now), but in Turkey all these issues combine in a mixture that is unique and may lead 
to serious problems. 
Taking the implications of dollarisation into account in the measurement of seigniorage leads one back 
to the fundamental issue of how to judge monetary policy in a country where the national central bank 
controls only the money supply in national currency.   
Daniel Gros is Director of CEPS and Head of the Economic Policy research programme. He thanks Anne Warren 
for dedicated research assistance. 
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1. Introduction 
The job of a central bank is to conduct monetary policy. In a market environment this should mean 
exchanging central bank money against assets of the private sector. Central bank money constitutes a 
rare commodity for the private sector, which needs it to facilitate transactions and it is used by the 
financial sector to clear its daily position in the money market. The conduct of monetary policy thus 
has a direct impact on the balance sheet of both the banking system and the central bank.  
In countries where the separation of the central bank from the fiscal accounts of the public sector is 
weak, monetary policy has also direct implications for fiscal policy, which in turn carries the threat 
that the aim of reaching price stability will be put in jeopardy by fiscal considerations. Moreover, in a 
country with a history of unstable money, the private sector usually starts using foreign money even 
for domestic transactions, which also has important consequences for the way the central bank can 
conduct its monetary policy. 
Central banks are not profit-maximising institutions. Their primary objective almost everywhere by 
now is to maintain price stability. They do nevertheless care about their balance sheets, in particular 
their profit and loss account, because avoiding losses is indispensable to preserving independence. 
Moreover, if a central bank makes losses, other agents, presumably market operators or the 
government, make corresponding profits. Loss-making operations with the private sector thus imply a 
subsidy, which contradicts the conduct of monetary policy in an open market economy. Loss-making 
operations with the government threaten directly central bank independence. 
For all these reasons it pays to investigate balance sheets and the resulting profit and loss accounts of 
central banks. This paper concentrates on the issues that arise in a special case, namely Turkey, but the 
discussion will be set in the European context, meaning taking into account the experience of countries 
that aim at joining either the eurozone (e.g. the new EU member countries) or the countries that are 
candidates for EU membership and thus potential future candidates for eurozone membership as well. 
As an aside, one should note that this problem is not confined to the newcomers to the European 
sphere of central bank independence and price stability. The national central banks (NCBs) that are 
now part of the Eurosystem had also accumulated large amounts of assets in the past. In EMU, most of 
these assets are no longer needed and could be dispensed with, but little has been done so far. 
Turkey constitutes an interesting case for the study of the implications of price stability for fiscal 
policy, because this country is well advanced on its way to this goal after a decade of endemic high 
inflation hovering close to three-digit levels. One concern in this context must be whether the loss of 
the inflation tax, usually called seigniorage, will make fiscal consolidation more difficult.  
Basic economic analysis suggests that high inflation rates should be reflected in high central bank 
profits (which are then transferred to the government). But whether or not this happens in reality 
depends on the size and composition of the balance sheet of the central bank. Or, to be more precise, 
the difference between the actual size of balance sheets and the theoretical balance sheet one could 
expect from a central bank is concerned exclusively with monetary policy and nothing else. 2 | DANIEL GROS 
 
To establish a benchmark of good (or rather acceptable) practice, it might be useful to start by briefly 
examining the balance sheet of the Eurosystem and then look at how it relates to that of the component 
NCBs. This is done in section 2, including a comparison with the balance sheets of two other G-3 
central banks (the US and Japan). Section 3 turns to the flows that should result from a central bank 
balance sheet, namely seigniorage, and shows how different concepts lead to different ways to 
measure seigniorage. Section 4 applies these concepts to the case of Turkey where high inflation, 
dollarisation and a peculiar balance sheet structure interacted in a particular way. Section 5 concludes. 
2.  What is the ‘European standard’ for central bank balance sheets? 
It might be useful to start with a comparative G-3 perspective, i.e. a comparison with the US and 
Japan. Table 1 lists the standard broad liability items for the Eurosystem, the US Federal Reserve and 
the Bank of Japan. The first item shows that the eurozone, Japan and the US have a monetary base of 
approximately the same size (about €430 to €450 billion). The third item shows that the total liabilities 
of the Eurosystem amount to about €700 billion, more than one and a half times its monetary base. In 
the case of the Fed, the difference between the monetary base and total liabilities is not so large. 
Japan’s situation is more similar to that of the Eurosystem, following extended ‘dual’ operations 
which, according to comments published by the Bank of Japan, were aimed at stabilising market 
interest rates. The 1997 situation was more similar to that of the Fed.  
An index of the degree to which a central bank has only monetary policy operations on its balance 
sheet can be constructed as the ratio of total liabilities over the monetary base in percentage. A value 
close to 100 indicates a balance sheet that is determined only by monetary policy operations, i.e. the 
provision of monetary base. In terms of this indicator, the Eurosystem scores over 170 against around 
120 for both the US Federal Reserve and the Japanese central bank.  
Table 1. The G-3 balance sheets compared (€ billion) 
  Sum of EU-11 
NCBs (1997) 
Eurosystem 2002  US Federal 
Reserve  
Bank of Japan 
Monetary base  429 554 442 405 
o/w Banknotes in 
circulation   335 440 414 381 
o/w Deposits of 
financial institutions  94 114 28  24 
Other liabilities and 
capital accounts  324 281  86  98 
Total liabilities and 
capital accounts  753 835 528 503 
Clean balance sheet 
indicator  175.5 150.7 119.5 124.2 
Source: Financial statements of national central banks, 1997 (details may not add to totals because of rounding). 
The consolidated data for the Eurosystem hide large differences between NCBs. Table 2 describes the 
situation for the component NCBs in terms of their degree of capitalisation. The Bundesbank, with 
142%, while still far from the US or Japanese values, has one of the lowest (leanest) capitalisation 
levels. The Banco do Portugal stands out at the other extreme, with total liabilities over three times 
greater than its monetary base. The explanation for this situation is that when reserve requirements 
were reduced from about 16% to the current level, the Banco do Portugal did not allow commercial 
banks to dispose of the deposits they had, but transformed them instead into medium-term liabilities 
which will mature in 2004. At that time, the balance sheet of the Banco do Portugal will shrink 
considerably, unless these liabilities are rolled over. FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND PRICE STABILITY: THE CASE OF TURKEY | 3 
 
Table 2. Clean balance sheet indicator: Total liabilities (incl. capital accounts)/ monetary base in % 
Germany France    Italy  Spain  Austria  Belgium  Ireland 
144.1 179.2  266.7  150.4  186.2  189.8  188.0 
Luxembourg Netherlands  Portugal  Finland EU-11  USA  Japan 
155.8 178.6  387.6  257.7  180.5  117.4  121.5 
Source: Financial statements of national central banks, 1997 and own calculations assuming a minimum reserve ratio of 2%. 
Why did EU NCBs accumulate so much capital and other liabilities unrelated to monetary policy? In 
the 1970s and 1980s, most central banks were not independent. Inflation was high and monetary 
policy was conducted also through administrative measures, creating distortions for the national 
banking system. Prior to monetary union, NCBs in a number of member countries had special 
relations with commercial banks and gave the public sector privileged financing. This was 
compensated for by large provisions to strengthen their capital base, thereby increasing the size of the 
central bank’s balance sheet, compared to the monetary base. 
In the 1990s, the process came to an end, partly because of the liberalisation of the banking system 
under the Internal Market programme and ultimately because the Maastricht Treaty prohibited central 
bank financing of the public sector. NCBs have nevertheless kept the assets and liabilities they had 
accumulated. An image of their past is thus being kept frozen in their balance sheets. 
What were the factors behind this diversity of balance sheet structures and the overblown size of some 
of them? If the above-mentioned conjecture about the genesis of the excessively large balance sheets 
is correct, there should be a correlation between the latter and central bank independence and inflation. 
Figure 1 plots the average inflation rate during the pre-Maastricht period (1967-90) against the 
capitalisation indicator. In countries with higher inflation, NCBs typically had balance sheets in which 
the monetary base was only a small part of total liabilities and capital accounts. The correlation 
coefficient between inflation and capitalisation is about 0.7 and statistically significant at the standard 
confidence levels.
1  
Figure 1. Average inflation and clean balance sheet indicator 
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1 As an aside it is interesting to note that the correlation between capitalisation and central bank independence is 
also strong and negative (see Bini-Smaghi and Gros, 2000, for details). The authors use the central bank 
independence indicator developed by Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991) and find that the more 
independence a central banks enjoys, the lower is its (over-)capitalisation. The correlation coefficient is about -
0.7 and statistically significant. 4 | DANIEL GROS 
 
The new member countries have a somewhat mixed history in terms of inflation and the organisation 
of their financial systems. This is reflected in the wide range of values for the (c)lean balance sheet 
indicator presented in Table 3. The data in panel A refer to one year, 2001. Panel B, below, shows 
several years’ worth of data for Turkey, because in this case the indicator varies considerably from 
year to year. 
Table 3. Clean Balance Sheet Indicator 
Panel A. New and prospective member states (total liabilities (incl. capital accounts)/monetary base in 
%) 
Bulgaria Czech  Republic  Estonia Hungary Latvia 
251.8 146.7  142.1  305.7  120.9 
Lithuania Poland  Romania  Slovakia  Slovenia 
136.6 168.7  347.0  148.8  574.4 
Source: Balance sheets of national central banks, 2002, and own calculations. 
Panel B. Turkey (in %) 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
TRL Monetary base  527  534  1061  776  551 
Source: Own calculations based on data from the Central Bank of Turkey. 
The data for Turkey fit this picture perfectly. The balance sheet of the Central Bank of Turkey (CBT) 
has fluctuated between 5 and 10 times the size justified by what would be needed to manage its 
national currency. On this indicator Turkey beats even the EU champion Portugal, which fits with its 
history of even higher inflation. 
NCBs’ balance sheet structures in the euro area have not changed with the move to EMU. They reflect 
the NCBs’ past degree of independence and inflation performance. The question is whether the large 
amounts of assets and liabilities that some central banks still carry on their balance sheets constitute a 
nuisance in the Eurosystem. 
The factors that have led to the current structure are not relevant anymore. The Eurosystem has been 
granted independence to conduct a monetary policy aimed primarily at maintaining price stability. 
Monetary financing of the government has been prohibited. Furthermore, monetary policy has to be 
conducted in line with the principles of an open-market economy with free competition. Finally, 
central bank transactions have to be fully collateralised. All these constraints make it useless for NCBs 
to hold a large amount of capital.  
Stripping central banks of their tasks as investment managers would allow them to concentrate on their 
role as guardians of price stability. This can only increase their independence. Otherwise, they would 
have to be held accountable not only for price stability, but also for their performance as managers of a 
large portfolio of foreign investments. What holds for the NCBs participating in the Eurosystem 
should hold a forteriori also for central banks from countries that are either candidates for EU or euro 
area membership. The independence of the central bank could be re-inforced by cleaning up balance 
sheets. Preparing to join the EU and subsequently the euro represents a good occasion to simplify and 
streamline NCBs’ balance sheets, which in many cases contain items that are only of historical 
interest.  
As this area falls formally under the responsibility of NCBs, it is up to them to act and dispose of parts 
of their assets and liabilities until the remainder is just equal to the monetary base plus a small capital 
and an appropriate revaluation reserve.    
In summary, restructuring of NCBs’ balance sheets would increase transparency and independence of 
national central banks by reducing possible conflicts of interest and thus allowing them to concentrate FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND PRICE STABILITY: THE CASE OF TURKEY | 5 
 
on price stability. There will no direct financial gains or losses from cleaning up balance sheets. But in 
some cases the management of foreign assets and liabilities constitutes a delicate problem that might 
be best solved by creating national debt boards (until the country joins the euro). 
Turkey is a case in point, and as usual the phenomenon is an order of magnitude larger than elsewhere. 
At the end of 2002, the CBT held foreign assets worth about 18% of GDP, but at the same time also 
had foreign liabilities of a similar amount. For an OECD country with a small risk premium on its 
foreign debt, these contemporaneous holdings of huge assets and liabilities might not matter because 
the cost of foreign liabilities should be the same as the return on foreign assets. But the case of Turkey 
is different. A large part of the foreign liabilities are due to IMF and World Bank loans, on which the 
country does not pay a large risk premium, but this will not be the case for all other liabilities, whose 
service will cost much more than the return from foreign exchange assets the CBT can expect. 
Table 4. Turkish monetary authorities’ balance sheet as % of GDP (2002) 
Assets   Liabilities   
   Reserve  money  7.7 
Foreign assets  17.5  of which currency outside DMBs*  2.5 
Claims on central government  19.5  Other liabilities to DMBs*  3.5 
Other assets    Foreign liabilities  21.7 
*DMB = Deposit Money Banks. 
Source: International Financial Statistics Yearbook 2003, IMF. 
3.  What is seigniorage? 
The discussion has so far focused on the stocks (balance sheets), but the flows that derive from these 
stocks are of even greater importance, in particular the flow revenue the central bank can expect from 
its monopoly of the issuance of national currency. This revenue is called seigniorage, or inflation tax. 
There is a large literature on what constitutes seigniorage (for further references see Schobert, 2001). 
Seigniorage is usually defined as the command over real resources the authorities can obtain by 
printing money or forcing banks to hold deposits with the central bank. If no interest is paid on the 
balances the banks are required to hold with the central bank the economic nature of these required 
reserves is similar to that of currency. The sum of cash and required reserves is called the monetary 
base. Most modern central banks (including the ECB) that do impose reserve requirements on 
commercial banks remunerate them at market rates. 
Taking into account interest payments on required reserves, total seigniorage, as a proportion of GDP, 
can then be measured by: 
(1) s1t = [D(Ct) + D(RRt) - irr,tRRt]/GDPt 
where D(Ct) and D(RRt) denote the change in currency in circulation and the change in total required 
reserves held by commercial banks with the central bank, respectively. The variable irr,t denotes the 
interest rate paid on these reserves. GDP stands for nominal GDP. This measure of seigniorage has 
been used often in empirical and policy oriented analyses of the EMS. However, this definition of 
seigniorage might lead to a situation in which for a given period measured seigniorage is negative 
because over a given period the monetary base has declined, for example because the reserve 
requirement coefficients have been changed or because the demand for cash has gone down. 
The definition of seigniorage employed in equation (1) measures a flow, namely the goods and 
services the government can buy by issuing additional fiat money or constraining commercial banks to 
hold additional deposits with the central bank. A different view of seigniorage emphasises the idea that 
currency can be regarded as a zero interest government bond. According to this view the revenue from 6 | DANIEL GROS 
 
seigniorage is the savings in interest payments the government obtains because it issues a zero interest 
rate bond. Taking into account interest payments on required reserves this second definition of 
seigniorage therefore implies that the revenue from seigniorage is given by: 
(2)  s2t = {itCt + [it - irr,t] [RRt]}/GDPt 
This expression shows that the imposition of required reserves always increases seigniorage as long as 
the interest rate on government debt (i.e. bonds), exceeds the interest rate paid on reserves, irr,t. This is 
likely to be the case most of the time in the euro-area since the required reserves are remunerated at 
the rate for short term inter-bank deposits, which is usually below the rate governments pay on their 
public debt. While for most countries this complication is quantitatively not very important, it is for 
Turkey, where T-bill rates and interbank deposit rates have diverged by as much as 20 percentage 
points. 
The economic meaning of the two definitions of seigniorage can be illustrated by comparing the 
government to a firm. The first definition would then correspond to the cash flow and the second 
definition would correspond to the earnings of the firm. It is not clear a priori which definition of 
seigniorage is more appropriate for an evaluation of the fiscal impact of financial integration in the 
EC. On the one hand, government revenues and expenditures are usually measured on a basis that is 
closer to the definition of cash flows and governments might therefore be more interested in the 
contribution of seigniorage to cash flow. On the other hand, if government revenues and expenditures 
were evaluated in terms of opportunity costs, the second definition of seigniorage would yield a more 
accurate measurement of the fiscal importance of seigniorage. 
The two definitions are often used in parallel because under ‘normal’ circumstances they lead to 
quantitatively similar results. The link between the two can be established via a simpl general money 
demand function, like: 
(3)  Mt = D(Ct) + D(RRt) = m(pt) GDPt 
where m(.) denotes ratio of monetary base to GDP, which is a function of the inflation rate, pt . It 
follows that the first concept of seigniorage can be written as a function of m(.) and the sum of 
inflation and the real growth rate of GDP, denoted by yt:  
(4)  s1t = m(pt)[pt+yt] - (irr,tRRt)/GDPt 
The second definition of seigniorage can be expressed as a function of the same variables if one 
decomposes the nominal interest rate in its real (rt) and nominal component (inflation): it=rt+pt: 
(5)  s2t = m(pt)[pt+rt] - (irr,tRRt)/GDPt 
The only difference between these two concepts is thus the difference between the real interest rate 
and the growth rate of real GDP. In general the two should move together in the long run (at least in a 
closed economy), but this is definitely not the case in the short run. In countries with stable economies 
the short run difference is, however, also limited as both real interest rates and real growth rates 
fluctuate between 0 (present) and 3% (longer run average for eurozone, and most eurozone member 
countries). Turkey is again different as real interest rates have at times exceeded 20% and real growth 
rates have fluctuated between close to minus 10 and plus 8%. 
For the concrete problem at hand the key is that the second concept of seigniorage actually 
corresponds to the profit a central bank should make, i.e. simply net interest income minus interest 
expenditures (neglecting other items like personnel, buildings etc. which might eat up a considerable 
proportion of seigniorage). A central bank whose only activity was to issue base money and invest the 
proceeds in government (or other) bonds would indeed make profits given by the equivalent formula 
(2) or (5). FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND PRICE STABILITY: THE CASE OF TURKEY | 7 
 
In principle it should be straightforward to determine the profits of central banks, but since the 
accounting of the Central Bank of Turkey is extraordinarily opaque (like that of most NCBs in Europe; 
only the US Federal Reserve is much more open) it is in reality very difficult to determine precisely 
how much the CBT has earned by its management of the Turkish lira. 
NCBs are typically required to pay out their accounting profits to the national Treasury. In Turkey the 
central banks is subject to corporate income tax (formally it is constituted as a private limited liability 
company) and it then has to pay over to the Treasury a sum that is equal to its (after-tax) profits minus 
two items: a deduction of around 25% for its reserve fund (ca. 20%) and another one of around 5% for 
its employees. This latter provision, while without macroeconomic relevance, seems to give the wrong 
incentives to the staff of the bank: if the bank achieves price stability they risk seeing their bonuses 
reduced.
2 Fortunately, it appears that the remuneration of the policy-making body of the CBT does not 
depend in this direct way from the profits of the bank. Through a combination of corporate income tax 
and other elements it appears that the government obtains about one-half of the profits of the CBT. 
But in reality central banks have a lot of leeway in the way they determine their profits and have 
always tended to hide them as much as possible. The most important instrument used by many NCBs 
to hide their true profits (seldom losses) is the accumulation of reserve funds and unrealised losses and 
gains and losses on foreign assets (gold and foreign exchange reserves). This is also the one mean 
reason for the relatively ‘long’ balance sheet of the ECB. 
4.  Actual seigniorage revenues and central bank profits: The case of 
Turkey 
In principle one would expect seigniorage revenues to be substantial given the very high inflation rates 
prevalent until recently. However, calculating seigniorage revenues is not straightforward in the case 
of Turkey. A first question that arises when one considers the concrete case of Turkey is the definition 
of the monetary base. The first standard element, cash in circulation, poses no problem, this refers to 
the currency issued by the CBT, i.e. Turkish lira. However, the second part of the monetary base, 
reserves of banks with the central bank, is usually measured (e.g. in the statistics of the International 
Monetary Fund) by including foreign currency deposits. But it should be apparent that if a country 
forces its financial institutions to hold non-remunerated deposits in a foreign currency, it is imposing a 
tax on the domestic banking system, but this cannot be called seigniorage. The limitation to the 
currency issued nationally must thus apply to the entire monetary base if one wants to measure 
seigniorage. The importance of this consideration for a highly dollarised economy like Turkey can be 
seen from the fact that TRL liabilities of the CBT towards domestic financial institutions are now only 
about one-third of its corresponding foreign currency liabilities. 
Table 5. Liabilities of the CBT towards domestic financial institutions (required plus free reserves) 
(% of GDP) 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
In  TRL    1.9 1.6 1.4 1.0 1.2 
In  foreign  exchange  3.9 3.4 5.8 3.9 2.8 
Source: CBT, annual reports. 
Seigniorage has thus to be calculated for Turkey using only the TRL part of the monetary base. This 
applies to both concepts of seigniorage. The cash flow concept just requires information on the annual 
changes in currency in circulation and the TRL part of the money base. The former was taken from 
IMF statistics, the latter was available only for the last few years from the CBT website. The same 
source was used for information on interest rates paid on required reserves. Over the last years interest 
rates have fluctuated widely in Turkey, with at times wide differences between interest rates on T-bills 
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and interbank rates. The latter were at times 20% higher because of the acute banking crisis. The CBT 
is now forbidden to extend credit to the government. Hence one might argue that the return the CBT 
should earn on its assets is the inter-bank rate. However, this rate incorporated a high risk premium to 
the banking crisis. Moreover, claims on the central government still make up about half of the total 
assets of the CBT (amounting to close to 20% of GDP in 2002). It seems thus preferable to use the T-
bill rate as an approximation of the risk-free rate the CBT could earn on its assets. The results 
produced on the basis of these data and assumptions are presented in Table 6. 
Table 6. Seigniorage in Turkey 
In % of GDP  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Cash flow from cash  1.1 1.1 0.7 0.9 0.8 
Cash flow from CBT TRL liabilities*    0.8  0.4  0.6  
Total cash flow seigniorage   1.9  1.1  1.5  
Interest gains from cash  1.8 0.6 2.1 1.5 0.9 
Interest gains from CBT TRL liabilities*   NA 0.5 0.9 0.6   
Total opportunity cost seigniorage   1.1  2.9  2.1  
*Adjusted for interest paid on reserves. 
Source: Own calculation based on CBT data. 
 
Even a cursory inspection of this table shows that with the high inflation rates from which Turkey has 
suffered so much over the last decade the state should have been able to profit from its monopoly of 
the issuance of money; earning around 2% of GDP on average over the last three years. The main 
reason for this relatively low yield from the inflation tax is, of course, that in a highly inflationary 
environment economic agents reduce the amount of domestic cash they hold to a minimum. The same 
applies to bank deposits, with the result that the base for the inflation tax shrank to a minimum. The 
average for the cash flow concept of seigniorage has been almost a third lower than the opportunity 
cost concept because of the high real interest rates prevailing during this period. A part of the 
seigniorage gains over the last years (perhaps as much as a third) were thus extra-ordinary, as can be 
seen by a simple calculation: cash in circulation plus the TRL liabilities of the CBT amount to about 
3.5-4.5% of GDP. This implies that a real interest rate of 12-20% will ybring an additional gain of 
about 0.42-0.9% of GDP. 
How do these theoretical gains relate to the actual profits of the CBT?  
Table 7. Seigniorage compared to profits of CBT 
In % of GDP  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
Profits declared by CBT as % of GDP  0.65 0.80  3.79  0.02 -0.43 
as % of government revenues  2.56 2.80  12.43  0.08 -1.83 
Pro memoria           
Interest gains from cash  1.8  0.6  2.1  1.5  0.9 
Interest gains from CBT TRL liabilities*   NA 0.5  0.9 0.6   
Total seigniorage opportunity cost     1.1  2.9  2.1   
*Adjusted for interest paid on reserves. 
Source: Own calculation based on CBT data. 
 
Table 7 shows that the profits of the CBT have been extraordinarily variable, falling from almost 4% 
of GDP in 2001 to close to zero in 2002 and then turning into a loss in 2003. This might be due to the 
fact that the law on the central bank was amended in the year 2000, giving it for the first time full 
independence and abolishing the privileged access of the Treasury (see Annex 1). Profit and loss FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND PRICE STABILITY: THE CASE OF TURKEY | 9 
 
accounts prior to 2000 can thus not be used to measure the seigniorage effectively transferred to the 
budget. This transfer could have taken place via zero or low interest ‘advances’ to the Treasury. 
Therefore, the opportunity cost concept represents a much better guide to the potential loss of revenue 
from price stability. For a comparison with the recent experience of some of the new member 
countries and some Southern EU members prior to EMU, see Annex 2. 
5. Concluding  considerations 
Achieving price stability has fiscal implications. This note has illustrated the order of magnitude of the 
issue for the particular case of Turkey. Estimates of the revenue from seigniorage show that the central 
bank (and thus ultimately the Treasury) should have benefited from the high inflation and high (real 
and nominal) interest rate environment, earning until recently approximately as much as 2% of GDP. 
Most of this will disappear once price stability has been established on a credible basis so that both 
real and nominal interest rates can fall below double digit levels. 
At that point a danger might arise for the independence of the CBT because it has a large amount of 
foreign assets and liabilities on its accounts. Given the large country risk premium for Turkey on 
international financial markets, it is likely that the CBT has to pay a higher interest rate on its 
liabilities than it receives on its foreign currency assets (which it also has to keep in a liquid form so 
that they can be readily mobilised). With foreign assets and liabilities on the balance sheet of the CBT 
amounting to about 20% of GDP, an interest differential of 2-3 percentage points could easily lead to 
losses worth 0.4-0.6% of GDP, i.e. more than the remaining seigniorage revenues the CBT could 
expect under price stability. In the year 2003, the CBT already recorded a small loss. This is not by 
itself decisive. But if it were to run sustained heavy losses because of its overblown balance sheet, its 
independence might in the end be put in danger. 
Another peculiar aspect of the CBT’s balance sheet is the fact that a large part of its foreign exchange 
reserves (close to one-half in 2002-03) came from its own ‘offshore’ operations. For some years a 
German branch of the CBT has collected deposits in euro (in the past DM) from Turkish citizens 
living in Germany which were then transferred via an exclusive agreement with one of the large 
German banks to its own foreign exchange reserves. The total thereby collected amounted, according 
to press reports, to around €15 billion. The CBT was also reported to have paid consistently above-
market interest rates on these deposits. This is another example of an activity that has nothing to do 
with guaranteeing price stability and should thus be discontinued as soon as possible. 
Price stability leads to a loss of the inflation tax, but it might also bring considerable benefits. It is well 
known that when inflation is high the real value of tax revenues is often eroded because any tax that is 
collected with some delay loses some of its value. This well-known ‘Oliviera-Tanzi effect’ will 
operate in Turkey as well. However, there is an additional effect that should be operating in Turkey 
once price stability becomes so secure that it no longer pays for economic agents to use foreign 
currencies. One aspect of this is the ‘dollarisation’ of bank deposits, which can be easily measured. It 
is now around 40% of total banking deposits, depending of course on the exchange rate. It is 
impossible to provide an equivalent measure for another variable that is more important, namely 
foreign currency in circulation, but some estimates exist. For example, Faruk (2003) reports that the 
US Federal Reserve had shipped (by 2002) around $10 billion to Turkey. This is more than the total 
cash in circulation in TRL, which amounts to about $4.5 billion. In Turkey the euro is as widely used 
as the USD, and it is thus likely that an equivalent amount of euro is also in circulation. This would 
imply that the total (foreign) currency in circulation in Turkey could be around 18-20 billion euros or 
dollars, equivalent to close to 10% of GDP. With an interest rate on Turkish foreign debt of around 7-
8%, this would imply that the cost to the Turkish economy of this high degree of 
dollarisation/euroisation must be close to 1% of GDP. It is likely that once price stability has been 
really established, currency holdings will change to a pattern like that of Bulgaria where the 
(domestic) cash-to-GDP ratio is now close to 8% of GDP. This implies that achieving price stability 
could save the Turkish economy foreign debt service equivalent to around 0.5-0.8% of GDP in flow 
terms (8-10% of GDP in stock or present value terms). | 10 
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Annex 1. Excerpt from the Law of the CBT 
 
Article 56- (As amended by Law No. 4651 of April 25, 2001) 
The Bank shall not, grant advance and extend credit to the Treasury and to public 
establishments and institutions, and shall not purchase debt instruments issued by the 
Treasury and public establishments and institutions in the primary market.  
  The Bank shall not extend credits and grant advances except for the operations 
authorized by this Law, and the credit to be extended and the advance to be granted shall 
not be unsecured or without cover, and in any manner whatsoever the Bank shall not, be a 
guarantor or provide security other than its own direct transactions. 
  
PART SEVEN 
ACCOUNTS AND BALANCE SHEET OF THE BANK, 
BULLETIN, EXCEPTIONS, EXEMPTIONS AND MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
  
CHAPTER I 
  
Provisions and Special Reserves 
Article 59- Provisions, in the amounts deemed appropriate by the Board, may be set 
aside from the gross annual profit of the Bank in order to meet contingent risks which may 
occur in the following years due to the operations exclusive to the Bank. 
Banknotes whose statute of limitation have expired as well as the differences arising 
from replacement in accordance with paragraph (b) of Article 37 shall be included in special 
reserves. 
  
Allocation of Profit 
Article 60- The annual net profit of the Bank shall be allocated in the following order: 
ca) 20 percent to the reserve fund; 
b) 6 percent of the nominal value of its share capital to the shareholders as the first 
dividend; 
c) a maximum of 5 percent of the remaining amount to the Bank personnel in an 
amount not to exceed the sum of two months' of their salaries; and 10 percent to the 
extraordinary reserve fund; after deducting the above-stated percentages; 
d) a second dividend to the shareholders in the ratio of a maximum of 6 percent of the 
nominal value of its share capital by a decision of the General Assembly. 
The balance shall be transferred to the Treasury after this allocation. 
  
Revaluation Differences 
Article 61- (As amended by Law No. 4651 of April 25, 2001) 
The unrealized valuation gains and losses, arising from the revaluation of gold and 
foreign exchange due to a change in the value of the Turkish currency, shall be monitored in 
a temporary account. In the event that these valuation gains and losses are realized, the 
realized amounts shall be transferred to the income statement, and then shall be subject to 
distribution from this account. | 12 
Annex 2. The potential loss of seigniorage from price stability 
 
Until some years ago many estimates of the potential inflation tax in CEECs arrived at figures of about 2-
3% of GDP. This was based on simple arithmetic: a cash-to-GDP ratio of between 5 and 10% combined 
with rates of growth of nominal GDP of 20 up to 30% (allowing for 5% real growth and inflation rate of 
between 15 and 25%). This set of figures has not been far from the experience in a number of CEECs 
until the mid-1990s (see Hochreiter et al., 1996). However, most of them have reduced inflation much 
below the figures mentioned above. They have done so because they realise the overall benefits from 
price stability and because inflation has other, less visible, negative effects of public sector revenues. 
Measured seigniorage is thus never a good guide to the impact of inflation on public sector revenues (the 
so-called Olivera-Tanzi effect). However, since superficial concepts of seigniorage are easy to calculate, 
this issue has attracted a lot of attention. 
It appears, moreover, that during the early years of the 1990s, countries like Poland and the Czech 
Republic have actually had very little seigniorage income at all because their central banks had to offset 
interest income against the losses on huge sterilisation operations. A more systematic investigation of this 
would require a closer look at the profit and loss accounts of all central banks, which cannot be done for 
all candidates.
3 However, Schobert (2001) provides a careful analysis of the three largest candidates (CR, 
H and PL). She finds that seigniorage amounted over the last years to actually only about 0.2 to 0.7% of 
GDP, much less than for the ‘Club Med countries’ during a comparable period, where it amounted to 
between 1 and 2% of GDP (not to speak of Germany, where it is 0.6% of GDP). Table A1 below shows 
the results: 
Table A1. Seigniorage as % of GDP 
  Average (1997-99)    Average (1986-9) 
Czech Republic  0.7  Germany  0.6 
Hungary 0.5  Greece  2.2 
Poland 0.2  Italy 0.9 
   Portugal  2.0 
   Spain  1.1 
Sources: Gros & Thygesen (1998) and Schobert (2001). 
 
                                                 
3 Central bank accounting for profits and losses is notoriously opaque even in the EU; see chapter 3 of Bini-Smaghi 
& Gros (2000). | 13 
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